Channels and instrumentalities

QUESTION: First, when discussing interstate commerce, is it acceptable to determine whether the legislation has substantial effects on interstate commerce before determining whether the legislation is regulating channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce? My reasoning is that the vast majority of examples I've come across have been substantial effects examples, so I'd rather start start with the usual suspect.

 

YES, THAT IS FINE. THERE IS NO MANDATED ORDERING. BUT JUST TO BE CLEAR, IT IS THE REGULATED ACTIVITY THAT MUST HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE, NOT THE LEGISLATION.

QUESTION: Second, and an alternative reason for wanting to start with Substantial Effects test, is can you clarify or distinguish channels and instrumentalities again? Is it fair to say that the channels are the mode of interstate activity and instrumentalities are the means? For example, highway trucking -- the highways are the mode and the trucks are the means?

 

YES, I THINK THAT IS ESSENTIALLY CORRECT, THOUGH THE COURT HAS NEVER USED THOSE PRECISE TERMS. I THINK OF CHANNELS AS THE "RIVERS" THROUGH WHICH COMMERCE FLOWS -- ROADS, NAVIGABLE WATERWAYS, RAILWAYS, TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS -- AND INSTRUMENTALITIES AS THE OBJECTS THAT FACILITATE THE COMMERCE -- RAILROAD CARS, AIRPLANES, ROUTERS, SERVERS, AND THE LIKE. BUT, BECAUSE THE COURT HAS NOT DECIDED A CASE INVOLVING ONE OF THESE CATEGORIES SINCE LOPEZ, WE ARE NECESSARILY GUESSING A LITTLE BIT.

Privleges or immunities

QUESTION: I am emailing you because I am having a hard time wrapping my head around the Privileges and Immunities of the 14th Amendment. My question deals with the analytical framework of the clause. I understand we first must determine whether the right is "fundamental".

 

ACTUALLY, NO, THAT IS NOT RELEVANT UNDER THIS CLAUSE -- AT LEAST AS I UNDERSTAND IT. SAENZ ESSENTIALLY HOLDS THAT THE THIRD COMPONENT OF THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL INTERSTATE -- THE RIGHT TO MIGRATE -- IS ONE OF THE PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES PROTECTED BY THE CLAUSE. THUS, AS I UNDERSTAND THAT DECISION, ANY INFRINGEMENT ON THIS RIGHT, NO MATTER WHAT IT IS WITH RESPECT TO, WILL BE SUBJECTED TO STRICT SCRUTINY. THAT IS, THE "RIGHT" ON WHICH THE STATE DISCRIMINATES AGAINST NEW RESIDENTS NEED NOT BE "FUNDAMENTAL" IN ANY SENSE.

 

QUESTION: I am unclear what test we apply to find out whether the right is "fundamental". Is it the same fundamental test we used for incorporation or something totally different?

 

AGAIN, I DO NOT THINK THERE IS ANY SUCH INQUIRY. THERE IS UNDER ART. IV, BUT THAT IS A DIFFERENT QUESTION.

 

QUESTION: Does the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment only deal with the 3rd right to travel - the right to migrate?

 

PROBABLY. PERHAPS IT ALSO PROTECTS THE FIRST COMPONENT -- THE RIGHT TO PHYSICAL MOVEMENT ACROSS STATE BORDERS -- BUT THE COURT HAS NOT CLEARLY SO HELD.

QUESTION: For example, let's say I, a California resident, went on vacation in Nevada. Under Art IV, Sec 2's privileges and immunities I would be able to enjoy the same privileges as a resident of Nevada, with some exceptions (i.e. - voting). However, if I established residence in Nevada, then I would be protected not under Art IV, Sec 2, but under the 14th Amendment. Is that correct?

 

YOU GOT IT. AND IN A CASE LIKE PROBLEM 6, IT IS SORT OF UNCLEAR WHICH OF THESE TWO PROTECTIONS APPLIES. BUT WE KNOW THAT IT CANNOT BE BOTH AT THE SAME TIME -- YOU ARE EITHER A NEW RESIDENT OF NEVADA, OR YOU ARE A CALIFORNIA RESIDENT VISITING.

Questions about Lochner and incorporation

QUESTION: I want to make sure I understand the difference between what Lochner said and the way it is now.  From my understanding, Lochner said that the right to contract was fundamental and that a state cannot regulate an individual economic right to contract (like minimum hours). Now, all the state needs is a legitimate interest (almost any public interest it seems) and a loose fit between the law and that interest. In effect, now a state can regulate minimum wage or hours nearly at will, whereas before, it was almost impossible. Is this a correct understanding?

 

ANSWER: Essentially, yes. I think there are a few more subtleties to Lochner that we did not really discuss. For instance, government could regulate the maximum hours of miners, for instance, because the Court saw that as raising "real" public safety concerns (as opposed to the "pretextual" ones asserted by New York in Lochner itself). But yes, your summary is basically correct.

QUESTION: The next question is when we should be considering historical recognition of a right and importance of that right.  We first talked about that in the incorporation context, but it was also mentioned tonight.  Should those considerations be taken into account /applied in any instance involving individual rights (economic or not)?

ANSWER: The question whether a right is "fundamental" as a matter of due process, such that the government's infringement on that right is subject to strict scrutiny, is precisely the same question we ask with respect to incorporation (i.e., whether one of the rights protected by the Bill of Rights applies to the states). Indeed, it is precisely the same issue, the only possible difference being that in the incorporation context, the right happens to be textually spelled out in one of the first eight amendments to the Constitution. But the "implicit in a scheme of ordered liberty"/"deeply rooted in the our nation's history and traditions" question is the same inquiry whenever we are asking whether a right is "fundamental" as a matter of due process. This is the incorporation question, precisely because the Court has held that the rights that are incorporated are those that are "fundamental." But, of course, it has not stopped with those textually spelled out in the Bill of Rights. Thus, it is also the question we ask in Griswold, in Roe, in Casey, and perhaps in Lawrence v. Texas and Perry v. Schwarzenneger.