Wednesday, May 13, 2009

GropupWise is back!

But it is now almost 11:00. I will try to answer what is in my in-box.

Groupwise seems to be down

I cannot get into my Groupwise account, either via the regular client or through the web portal. I apologize if you have a question waiting in my in-box. I will keep trying throughout the evening. Once I can access my e-mail, I will post my answers here.

Preemption

QUESTION: I noticed on your 2001 practice exam in the question about a federal voting regulation where Congress was imposing a nationwide standard, that preemption wasn't an issue. I'm having trouble seeing where it is or isn't an issue. Does preemption only come into play in terms of commercial regulation rather than something like voting?

ANSWER: No. Preemption has nothing to do with the particular subject matter at issue. It is relevant when a party invokes state law, and the defendant claims that the state law is invalid or inapplicable because it is preempted (it conflicts with a validly enacted federal law). I'm not remembering exactly the facts of the hypo you reference, but my guess is that no one was invoking a state law, thus preemption was beside the point.

Lopez and aggregate effects

QUESTION: Under the substantial affects prong of Lopez, if the activity examined is neither economic or commercial, can we still examine it in the aggregate or must be examine it as an individual instance?

ANSWER: The Court says, in Lopez or Morrison (I forget which) (and I'm paraphrasing): "We have never upheld the regulation of an intrastate, noncommercial activity based on its aggregate effects on interstate commerce." That is obliquely worded. It is not saying conclusively that such effects can never be aggregated. But it is also the most logical inference, perhaps with a small escape hatch.

Raich

QUESTION: I cannot see how Raich helps our analysis under the Commerce Clause discussion. Unless we assume that noncommercial, intrastate activities can be aggregated to substantially affect interstate commerce, it appears to be relatively similar to Lopez and Morrison. Can you help?

ANSWER: I will try. The statute challenged in Raich was the Controlled Substances Act, which Angel Raich conceded regulated an interstate commercial market. Thus, it is the CSA which we, as a first tier matter, subject to the Lopez test. Doing so, we conclude that, because it regulates a commercial activity, it fits within the third category. Angel Riach argued, though, that Congress was under an obligation to except her activity from the coverage of the CSA because her activity was noncommercial and purely intrastate. The Court said no. The Court did NOT say that her noncommercial, intrastate activity could be aggregatged, and thus it had (as a class) a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Instead, the Court held that the CSA was regulating commercial activity, and Congress need not create an exception to such valid regulation (for intrastate noncommerical instances of the regulated activity) when it has a reasonable basis for concluding that such an exception will undermine the broader regulatory program (i.e., the CSA). In this way, Angel Raich's specific activity was not what Congress targeted, unlike Rodrigo Lopez's possession of a gun of a school zone. In Raich, the regulated activity was the distribution of narcotics, and this makes the doctrinal analysis different.

Article IV, section 2 "fundamentalness"

QUESTION: Art. 4., section 2 protects states from infringing on fundamental rights. It is my understanding that these are very narrow: right to travel, right to pursue common calling or vocation etc. My question is are the fundamental rights that are derived from substantive due process, like the right to marriage or right to privacy, protected as well by Art. 4.2?

ANSWER: Two response. First, I don't think the list of rights considered "fundamental" for purposes of Article IV, section 2 is all that narrow. It includes, for instance, the right to pursue a common calling, the right to own and dispose of property, the right of access to the courts, and a host of other things thought "important to the unity of the nation." Second, I would say probably, yes, to your second question, as that category is so much smaller. There are not that many rights that are so important -- "implicit in any scheme of ordered liberty" -- as to be "fundamental" as a matter of due process. Thus, it is likely true (though I'm not certain) that those rights that are fundamental under the Due Process Clause would also be considered a "privilege" or "immunity" for purposes of Article IV.

Tiers of scrutiny

QUESTION: Carolene Products and Lee Optical = rational basis/ deferential reivew

ANSWER: I agree.
QUESTION: Griswold= strict scrutiny
ANSWER: Agreed.

QUESTION: Roe= Strict scrutiny
ANSWER: Agreed.

QUESTION: Casey= intermediate scrutiny (it seems that the court is rejecting the use of strict scrutiny for abortion cases in favor of an "undue burden" analysis which i am guessing is some form of intermediate scrutiny)
ANSWER: I would say Casey just does not really plot on this graph. It is different. The "undue burden" standard, in a sense, is a specific translation of the protection of the woman's fundamental right in light of the state's legitimate (and perhaps more than that) interest in the fetus. I'm not sure we can say much more than that in terms of where it "fits."

QUESTION: Also, in regards to footnote 4 in Carolene Products, does Stone mean that in those three situations (the right is enumerated, effects political process, aimed at discrete/insular minorities) that strict scrutiny should be used instead of deferential review or was he merely saying that something more then deferential review should be used w/o actually specifying what standard should be used instead?

ANSWER: Given that this was purely dicta, he was not getting so specific. I think he was generally suggesting that, in these circumstances, some level of more aggressive judicial review, something certainly more than rational basis, may be appropriate. But, given the context, he had no reason to be any more detailed than this.