Thursday, January 14, 2010

Supreme Court blocks broadcast of Prop 8 trial

Late yesterday, the Supreme Court issued a 17-page opinion blocking the broadcast of the trial proceedings in the lawsuit seeking to declare California's Proposition 8 unconstitutional. You can find the ruling here. Four justices -- Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor -- dissented. The Court did not rule more broadly on whether, and under what circumstances, federal trial proceedings can be broadcast. Rather, it found that the specific procedure for permitting such broadcast had not been followed by the district court in this instance. As the per curiam opinion states in its first paragraph, "the broadcast in this case should be stayed because it appears the courts below did not follow the appropriate procedures set forth in federal law before changing their rules to allow such broadcasting. Courts enforce the requirement of procedural regularity on others, and must follow those requirements themselves."

Is the very predictable, 5-4 ideological split on this rather minor, procedural point a preview of how the Court will ultimately rule on the merits if and when the case gets there? I think there is reason to think it is. But that is still probably years away, so who knows?

Monday, January 11, 2010

An important point about Marbury

As we will discuss in class Wednesday, a very important procedural point in Marbury v. Madison is that Marbury filed his suit directly in the Supreme Court, as an "original action." ("Original" because the suit originated in the Supreme Court itself.) As a result, the extent of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to hear original actions is critical to resolving the case, at least as the legal issues were framed by the Court. And this original jurisdiction is addressed in the Constitution in Article III, section 2, clause 2.
When you examine that clause, you will see that it makes reference to "Ambassadors [and] other public Ministers and Consuls." Today, we might well think of the Secretary of State, the defendant in Marbury, as a "public minister." But the meaning in Article III is narrower than it would be in modern parlance: it refers specifically to representatives of foreign governments. Thus, as everyone agreed at the time, Secretary of State James Madison was not a "public minister" for purposes of Article III.
This point is important to following Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning in Marbury. I intended to mention it at the end of class but forgot.

Opinions tomorrow and Wednesday

The Supreme Court has announced that it will hand down opinions both tomorrow (Tuesday) and Wednesday. It seems likely that the Court will decide Citizens United v. FEC, the case involving federal laws limiting campaign spending (specifically, in this case, "Hillary, the Movie").

Citizens United
is the case that the Court held over from last Term and was reargued in September. If oral argument is any indication, the justices appear poised to invalidate a raft of restrictions on campaign spending by corporations and labor unions, ushering in a whole new (some have termed "gilded") era in campaign finance.

Thus far, the Court has only handed down four opinions in cases argued this Term.

Thursday, January 7, 2010

Spring 2010

Welcome to all of the students enrolled in my Constitutional Law course for spring semester, 2010. I will be using this blog during the semester to supplement our discussions in class -- to answer lingering questions, to clarify points, to comment on current events, and to provide more thorough explanations than our time in class sometimes provides.

For today, let me point you to an interesting article appearing in the current edition of the New Yorker: a lengthy story by Lauren Collins on the newest Supreme Court justice, Sonia Sotomayor.

Wednesday, May 20, 2009

Diane Wood in D.C.

According to this report from Jan Crawford Greenburg, Judge Diane P. Wood of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit made an unexpected trip today to Washington, D.C. Under the circumstances, it is not hard to come up with some plausible reasons for the visit. Most observers seem to think the President is likely to announce the nomination next week.

Thursday, May 14, 2009

Chadha

QUESTION: I think I understand that Congress can delegate its legislative power to executive and administrative agencies, but cannot subsequently retract it (Such a “legislative veto” is unconstitutional. INS v. Chadha). We also talked about the exceptional conditions in which just one house can act alone (impeachments, presidential elections, treaty ratification, etc.). What I’m not sure of is what exactly Congress as a whole CAN veto?

ANSWER: What matters is not
whether Congress's action might be characterized as a "veto" -- a rejection of administration policy. What matters is whether Congress, when it acts to affect the rights and responsibilities of persons outside the legislative branch, has followed all of the requirements of the lawmaking process set out in Article I. That was the real (and only) problem in Chadha.

Wednesday, May 13, 2009

Substantive due process

QUESTION: I am having trouble separating the controversy surrounding the incorporation of the Bill of Rights from the doctrine of substantive due process. Is it correct to say that substantive due process arose from a belief that there are rights "implicit in a scheme of ordered liberty" and "basic in our system of jurisprudence" that were not included in the Bill of Rights, and therefore couldn't be incorporated?

ANSWER: Not quite. First, the first substantive right to be adjudged by the Supreme Court to be protected by the Due Process Clause was the right to "just compensation" protected by the Fifth Amendment. Thus, at its outset, substantive due process arose because of incorporation. Second, I would agree that the Court came to believe that certain rights that are "implicit in a scheme of ordered liberty" and "basic in our system of jurisprudence" are not set out in the first eight amendments to the Constitution. And if that is case -- and the Court had already set these as the standard for what due process means -- that leads to the protection of some unenumerated rights. That explains why the Court has come to protect certain rights are "fundamental" and constitutionally protected even though they do not appear in the Constitution. But unenumerated and substantive are different ideas. It is true that many (perhaps all) of these unenumerated rights are substantive. But that need not have been the case.

QUESTION: I am also trying to figure out how West Coast Hotel/Lee Optical overrule Lochner - it seems that they are recognizing that state governments are not free to intermeddle with individual's economic activities at their whim, but hold that rational basis scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny is appropriate for determining if the interference with economic activity is valid. Is this close? Any clarification would be greatly appreciated.

ANSWER: Well yes, that is true. Those decisions move the level of review from something approaching strict scrutiny to something approaching nonexistent (rational basis) review for ordinary economic legislation under the Due Process Clause. To me, that is a 180-degree turn. The difference between the aggressive form of judicial review in Lochner, and the all-you-need-is-some-hypotetically-plausibly-rational-basis review of Lee Optical is that between night and day. And that is why I think it is fair to say that the later decisions effectively overruled Lochner (though they did not do so explicitly).