I have been answering questions for the past two weeks by e-mail, but without posting those questions and answers here. So, over the next week, I am going to try to get them all up -- a sort of potpourri of congressional powers inquiries. Here is the first installment.
QUESTION: I am having difficulty reconciling Printz and New York. The way I understood the 10th Amendment and its effect on limiting congressional powers is that Congress can regulate certain activity under the commerce clause, and create a law like it did in Raich or in Garcia, regulating said activity (wage and hours and illciit drug use). However, as New York stated, it can't "commander" a state to regulate activity. So like in Raich, Congress could not make a law that made California reject its Compassion Use Act and enforce it to regulate personal drug use, but the federal government was not stopped from regulating personal drug use.
ANSWER: Exactly.
QUESTION: In addition, the law has to be generally applicable and can't just fall on the states.
ANSWER: Well, I would not quite say it that way. New York distinguished Garcia on that ground, so we know that a generally applicable law is not a commandeering. But that does not mean (as a matter of formal logic, or I think through a thorough understanding of the doctrine) that any law that is not generally applicable is necessarily a commandeering.
QUESTION: There the federal govenment can regulate states and private individals alike, but it can't leave that regulation up soley to the states.
ANSWER: More precisely, Congress cannot force the states to do the regulation. Congress can leave the regulation up to the states, in the sense that it can leave the area unregulated by the national government.
QUESTION: I think I understand all that, but then Printz comes along and says that the Brady Handgun Act is a violation of the 10th Amendment. But to me it does not seem any different than Garcia. Garcia allowed Congress to set a minimum hour and wage and if that was not followed by the states or individuals, Congress could punish them. To me, Printz is not "commandering," but merely setting a standard action that needs to be done by all.
ANSWER: I think you are misunderstanding the facts of Printz. The provision that was challenged required state executive officers to run background checks. Only government officials were covered by the provision (though obviously it affected private persons).
QUESTION: To me, Printz can be likened to Garcia moreso then to New York because it is merely prohibting conduct and setting a standard for compliance (background checks must be done, like a minimum wage must be set) as oppossed to commanding states to act a certain way. Can you help clarify this for me ?
ANSWER: Again, the law in Printz was a coercive directive aimed at the governmental authority of the state executive branch (the CLEOs). No private persons were required to conduct background checks. (Nor would any private persons have had the authority to conduct such checks.)