Just to put a little more flesh around the bones of the political questions doctrine, consider the following political questions decisions:
* In Nixon v. United States (involving a district court judge, not the President), the Supreme Court held that the judge's challenge to the procedure adopted by the Senate for trying his impeachment (where not all Senators were present for all aspects of the trial) presented a political question. (Here, the Court emphasized the "textual commitment" criterion.)
* In Goldwater v. Carter, an individual challenged the President's unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. from a treaty with Taiwan. (The treaty had been previously ratified by the Senate, as required for all binding treaties.) The contention was that the President also needed the assent of the Senate before dissolving a treaty. The Court held that whether the Constitution requires such assent presented a political question.
* As I mentioned last night, in a case that challenged the legality of the Clinton administration's commitment of U.S. troops to the former Yugoslavia, the lower federal courts held the case presented a political question. (There was also a problem with standing.)
Obviously, the doctrine is fairly malleable and amorphous. To be sure, the six factors identified in Baker v. Carr are relevant. But those factors hardly identify which cases will be judged to present political questions with any degree of certainty. It is important to keep in mind that very, very few cases are judged to present nonjusticiable political questions. Indeed, we can basically count on our hands all of the cases in which the Supreme Court has reached such a result.